TOP SECRET // REL TO USA
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE PENTAGON, WASHINGTON, DC
28 MAY 19
Anti-Air Munitions moving into Anizay
(TS) Combined intelligence efforts reveal the current state of Militia anti-air armorments, and their plans to complete a resupply of the same.
(TS) COMINT reveals that the chief armorer for the militia is working to provide a supply of Misagh-1 MANPAD SAM missiles from an unknown Iranian source.
(TS) FININT efforts are currently working to uncover the identity and location of the source, currently only known by the code name "Abdella".
(TS) IMINT has been able to fix the location of a convoy moving towards Anizay from the country interior, believed to have originated in or around Rondon or Setumba.
(C) Disrupting this resupply operation has been deemed top priority for the next phase of intelligence and kinetic efforts.
Background
(C) Earlier 1-506 patrols were able to locate two key pieces of intelligence, which were the catalyst for this intelligence effort. A patrol by Task Force Charlie was able to reveal the code names and keywords being utilized, while a squad patrol turned over the key locations of the movement of these armaments.
(TS) The militia's chief armorer has been identified as Amare Aron. A long-term Khas resident, he was recently forced to displace deep into Oben district, in order to gain distance between the conflict and his operations, both for his families safety and the stability of his operations. Now based out of the small town of Mahajerin, he is relying on his hard-earned network of contacts to undertake a lot of his legwork, while he remains within his relatively secure base of operations. Aron's family are long-standing Kafistrop loyalists, with several political and government ties across his family, it's believed that his motivations are as much to do with a desire to see stability in his country as they are an extension of the pack mentality growing within the militia.
(C) Several intercepted communications point to a source smuggling goods into the Rondon ports, past the Elite Guard, and into the sparsely populated Kafistrop interior. S-2 has been able to determine from these communications that the militia has virtually run out of SAM missiles, and experienced a significant morale boost after the downing of US rotary assets in recent weeks. In an effort to keep morale high and continue their ability to long-range target US assets, the militia is now in desperate need of resupply.
(C) After a week of coordination, militia assets are now ready to move their sourced missiles into the militia stronghold in Anizay. They are expected to use a route in along the southern border of the region, expected to be making a stop through the town of Gorgan on their way in. The additional IMINT capabilities provided by the Task Force will be responsible for locating the specific movement of the convoy as it rolls in.
(TS) A successful ambush on the convoy and a successful raid on Mahajerin are critical to retaining clear airspace around Boston Airbase in Anizay and Phoenix Airfield to it's south.
IMINT Analysis
(TS)
(TS) JSTARS GMTI (Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System Ground Moving Target Indication) analysis shows a high density of regular activity (pictured) around the southern Anizay border/northern FATA border, of the average size and composition expected of munitions convoys, based on the comparison of similar convoys in and around Iran.
(C) Analysis shows several regular patrol/convoy routes, staging points and forward observers in and around the expected smuggling route.
COMINT Analysis
(C) COMINT has been analyzing a large number of intercepted communications ranging from texts from cell phones to satellite phones and some emails to and from known Militia accounts. The overall subjects of these messages and other communications indicate that the Militia is feeling that it has a chance of winning against the Elite Guard. They have defeated the Elite Guard in the Badlands with relatively light casualties when facing them. The casualties that have been suffered are what the Militia themselves have called "devastating losses". However, the back and forth communications indicate that these losses are spread out amongst the different militia cells and that no single Militia force has been weakened to critical levels with the exception of the one that held COP Austin (This force lost almost its entire inventory of armored vehicles).
(C) Despite these casualties at American hands, it appears that the Militia leadership are in agreement about launching a concerted offensive against the Southern Badlands to secure their lines of communication and supply and force the Elite Guard to fall back. One email chain indicates that some of the more aggressive Militia soldiers wish to attack Boston Airbase directly. There were conversations bragging about how some of these soldiers and lower leadership Militia fighters wanted to continue to build on their momentum and take more BLUFOR and INDFOR positions. The overall mood of the Militia, at least amongst the lower members, seems to be confident, but realistic. These individuals are not fanatics, and appear to have the competence to avoid doing anything that risks a strategic defeat.
(TS) There were also video files that were being shared amongst the Militia leadership. These files are helmet and gun camera footage taken by ROMN and LOTN forces who engaged with 1-506 during Operation THUNDERSTORM as well as ISIS and AQ footage from Operation LIONHEART. Amongst these email streams were articles relating to other operations undertaken by 1-506 task forces, which include Operations CRIMSON MOON, RED HAMMER, and BLACK ADDER. Someone in the Militia has been doing research on their opponents and is studying how 1-506 Task Forces conduct operations. This proves that the Militia will be more difficult to combat than other insurgencies the 506th has fought in the past.
Classified By: S-2 Operations Command
Reason: 1.4(a)
Declassify On: 20290528END REPORT
TOP SECRET // REL TO USA
