SECRET
UNITED STATES ARMY
INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND, FORT BELVOIR, VA
30 NOVEMBER 2024
Area of Operations Profile: Ramadi and Fallujah
(U) Administrative
All acronyms utilized in the following brief are proactively defined and utilized strictly for the streamlining of text and characters. All acronyms in the following report are defined/transcribed in full upon initial use and then abbreviated for subsequent use. The "Spoilers" marked part below contains utilized acronyms/abbreviations and their definitions and is closed simply to condense report size.
U - Unclassified. Used for government documents that do not merit a particular classification or which have been declassified. The information is low-impact, and therefore does not require any special protection, such as vetting of personnel.
CUI - Controlled Unclassified Information: Previously used as the "For Offical Use Only/FOUO" caveat for classifying unclassified, but internally distributed information, intended for controlled release to authorized persons only, but not sensitive enough to warrant SECRET marking & handling procedures.
C - Confidential. This is the lowest classification level of information obtained by the government. It is defined as information that would "damage" national security if publicly disclosed without the proper authorization.
AAK - Abna Al-Karbouli (translation: Sons of Al-Karbouli).
IAF - Iraqi Armed Forces.
HUMINT - Human intelligence.
(C) Overview(C) The intent of this document is to provide general information regarding the current situation, terrain, and state of hostile forces throughout the areas of Ramadi and Fallujah, both within Al Anbar Governorate, Iraq. Additionally, tactical analysis and projections regarding expected enemy actions, collated from information available at the time of dissemination have been provided, however, it can also be expected that any analysis provided is based upon tactics and pattern of life (POL) intelligence at the time of observation, and not a definitive or all-encompassing blueprint as to the complete capability of hostile & belligerent forces due to the inherently unpredictable and rapidly-changing battlespace as a result of armed conflict.
(C) In addition, predictions as to the intentions of the militia and the Abna Al-Karbouli (AAK) (translation: Sons of Al-Karbouli), and the manner in which these adversaries are expected to use the urban terrain against coalition forces shall be detailed below. These assessments are based on the working theory that hostile and belligerent militia groups are acting partially or entirely within the composition of the AAK, based upon intelligence reports and information collected by the CIA's surveillance operations throughout the region.
(CUI) Terrain Overview
Fig. 1: Satellite view of Ramadi and Fallujah
(CUI) Ramadi is a city in central Iraq, about 110 kilometers west of Baghdad and 50 kilometers west of Fallujah. It is the capital and largest city of Al Anbar Governorate which touches on Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. The city extends along the Euphrates which bisects Al Anbar. The large majority of the civilian population live within Ramadi itself, with smaller villages scattered throughout the countryside. Ramadi is located in a fertile, irrigated, alluvial plain, within Iraq's Sunni Triangle, and as such the city is surrounded by farm land to its North and West. While the area is mostly flat, irregular ridgelines and cliffsides can be seen across the terrain, with oases and green zones interspersed. While Ramadi has been less visibly affected by the recent violence thanks to the various old U.S. military bases dotting the landscape that have been re-occupied by the IAF, the signs can still be seen in the much reduced civilian traffic, constant military/police patrols, and hastily-built checkpoints.
Fig. 2: City of Ramadi
(C) As the Euphrates has split the city into clear sectors, the hastily-built checkpoints at the bridges have done an admirable job at keeping the violence at bay. However, suppressing traffic can only be a temporary solution until the city must resume its regular activities or it may suffer dramatic, long-term economic decline. In the meantime, extremist chatter can still be detected within each individual sector, with all signs pointing towards sudden violence the moment security becomes lax. Outside the city, the numerous villages and farming communities have remained quiet during daytime, but unusual activity have been detected at night, pointing towards possible insurgent and militant activity. Evidence remains inconclusive on whether the factions inside and outside of Ramadi are cooperating with each other, or with the AAK, or neither.
Fig. 3: Farmlands to the West of Ramadi
(CUI) Fallujah is a city in Al Anbar Governorate, Iraq. Situated on the Euphrates River, it is located roughly 69 kilometres to the west of the capital city of Baghdad. Within Iraq, it is known as the "city of mosques" due to the 200+ mosques that can be found throughout the city as well as in the surrounding villages. While Fallujah's footprint is smaller than Ramadi, its population density is much higher, resulting in a more condensed and claustrophobic urban environment. The recent violent protests and militant activities have destroyed much of the center neighborhood surrounding the TV Tower, as well as the Northern neighborhood near Fallujah Train Station. Public services and transportation within the city have completely ceased, and trash and debris can be found scattered across the city.
Fig. 4: City of Fallujah
(C) Outside the city are various utility, agricultural and industrial areas, such as the Fallujah Steelworks to the West and the Al-Tabiah Farm to the South. These areas have been spared much of the fighting, which has turned them into safe havens for fleeing civilians. Numerous abandoned or otherwise under-manned military bases nearby have also been re-occupied by the IAF, though their readiness status and morale if they ever come under attack is questionable. A UN humanitarian base has also recently been constructed to the South-East of the city, where a stream of civilian and medical vehicles can be seen entering and exiting during all hours of the day. It is possible that insurgents may have infiltrated all of the above locations, and are actively conducting reconnaissance/recruitment activities within.
Fig. 5: Fallujah Steelworks
(CUI) Both cities were key locations during the Iraq War for the Iraqi insurgency, and while ISIS has since degraded greatly within Iraq due to the efforts of the Iraqi government, the local populace well remembers the devastating effects of the conflict, the signs of which are still present today. A returning U.S. military is unlikely to find themselves greeted with cheer.
(C) The compound that was the site of the latest attack on CIA and Marine personnel is located in the East of the city, hereby called the "Embassy". While the compound itself now lies abandoned, critical personnel and material have been successfuly evacuated with the help of the IAF, who have since also retreated from the compound.
(C) Expected Enemy Actions
(C) Any OPFOR faction is likely to find succor and support from civilians throughout the region. The United States military's rules of engagement are well-known, and OPFOR is likely to exploit them to the fullest extent possible such as by hiding behind or pretending to be civilians, storing caches within areas of worship, or employing insurgent tactics such as IEDs and suicide bombers. Civilian deaths will be used as additional political kindling by whichever faction arrives on the scene first, to radicalise and convert more civilians into fighters for said faction. As public infrastructure degrades further due to the city's regular maintenance operations being frozen during the conflict, humanitarian aid camps and casualty treatment centers will become hotbeds for recruitment activities and bombing threats alike, depending on which faction's casualties are being treated within on that day.
(C) The urban environments within downtown Ramadi and Fallujah will aid OPFOR movement throughout the cities to remain undetected. An OPFOR element could ambush BLUFOR from afar, break contact to conceal or stash their weapons, wait for BLUFOR to pass, then conduct another ambush from a different position with weapons from a different cache. All BLUFOR elements must also prepare for constant ambush threats from elevated positions such as apartment buildings or rooftops, and take great caution in investigating and collecting possible intelligence, which may just as likely be honey pot traps. Civilian aid is therefore just as suspect, and all troopers must exercise their observational and communication skills to determine the trustworthiness of their HUMINT sources.
(C) The entire Al Anbar Governorate has been in a state of great political unrest, which was only accelerated after Mohammed Nouri al-Karbouli's resignation. Bombings and faction warfare now occur daily, day and night. If given a common enemy, the various militant factions are likely to temporarily unite and fight together, whether it be against the AAK, the IAF, or the United States military.
Original Classifying Authority: 1-506th S-2 Intelligence
Classified By: 1LT J.N. Lee
Reason: 1.4(a), (c), (d)
Declassify On:
20491130
END REPORT
The entirety of this document represents fictional works of the 506th Infantry Regiment Realism Unit, S-2 Intelligence Shop, developed for use within the Arma Reforger military simulation video game, and exists purely for entertainment and educational purposes only. The story, all names, characters, and incidents portrayed are fictitious. No identification with actual persons (living or deceased), places, buildings, and products is intended or should be inferred.
