SECRET
UNITED STATES ARMY
INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND, FORT BELVOIR, VA
27 AUG 2022
(S) Area of Operations Profile: Kirov Outskirts
(U) Overview(U) *All acronyms used in this brief are proactively defined and used strictly for the streamlining of text & characters. If you are unsure of an acronym being used, it is defined/transcribed in its full length upon its initial use, and then abbreviated for subsequent use.
CUI - Controlled Unclassified Information: Previously used as the "For Offical Use Only/FOUO" caveat for classifying unclassified, but internally distributed information, intended for controlled release to authorized persons only, but not sensitive enough to warrant SECRET marking & handling procedures. (CUI) The intent of this document is to provide general information regarding the current situation, terrain, and state of hostile forces throughout the southeastern outskirts of Kirov, Mary Province, Turkmenistan. Additionally, tactical analysis and projections regarding expected enemy actions, collated from information available at the time of dissemination have been provided, however, it can also be expected that any analysis provided is based upon tactics and pattern of life (POL) intelligence at the time of observation, and not a definitive or all-encompassing blueprint as to the complete capability of hostile & belligerent forces due to the inherently unpredictable and rapidly-changing battlespace as a result of armed conflict. (C) In addition, predictions as to the intentions of the New World Revolutionary Corps (NWRC) and the manner in which these adversaries are expected to use the Southern Inhabited Shelf against coalition forces shall be detailed below. These assessments are based on the working theory that hostile and belligerent militia groups acting partially or entirely within the composition of the NWRC, based upon AARs and infomation collected during the initial month of peacekeeping and relief operations conducted by US/UN coalition personnel throughout Turkmenistan.(U) Terrain Overview (CUI)
(CUI) 
(CUI) Kirov Outskirts is settled in a nook of the Galkan Gory mountain range that looms south and east of Mary, Turkmenistan. Translated roughly as "Shield Mountains", most of the region is characterized by steep ravines, foothills, dry or sandy ridges, and plateaus. Both flora and fauna are hardy and scarce. Tectonic activity is ongoing, and the vicinity has been subjected to severe earthquakes during the 20th century. Increased elevation, combined with drastic swings in temperature during summer threatens those not local to the terrain in the form of heat and hypoxia-related injuries, further emphasizing the importance of proper acclimatization, physical conditioning, and of course, hydration. (CUI) A significant civilian population that lives upon subsistence agrarian ways has settled in small hamlets all along the Khanabad river, which runs north-to-south through the western AO and dominates the local economic focus. At large junctions, small cities have gone up, and significant foot, vehicular, and marine traffic channels through them. Such settlements include Sheykheh-Mata in the northwest, Kala Yusufi in the east, and Zor-Khalata in the southwest. Still, others have taken herds of livestock- specifically goats, further upwards to sparse mountain villages to avoid fighting and militia influence alike. (CUI) To the east, Kirov's valleys are filled with the remnants of ancient settlements that were once used as feudal fortresses. Some of these locales are still believed to be frequented by squatters, refugees, as well as whatever petty merchants make their living so far from the Khanabad. Narrow alleys and partial walls are typically found assembled around central compounds that have since been converted into mosques.(C) 
Above: The Khanabad River, near its southern terminus. In the distance, the outer reaches of Zor-Khalata's community are visible.
(C)
Terraced mountain fortresses with disused defensive implements such as this one exist spread throughout the easternmost parts of the Southern Inhabited Shelf. (S) Urban zones have been the source of enduring threats to coalition forces since the initiation of UNOTURM in July 2022. Initial ambushes against partner UN peacekeeping forces were staged from sufficiently supplied, but rapidly prepared positions. Intelligence strongly suggests that those taken captive by NWRC forces are believed to be moved away from flashpoints and areas where skirmishes with coalition forces are likely. It has also been confirmed that, in addition to using the local populace to mask and camouflage logistical and battlefield preparation efforts, militia groups are increasingly seeking refuge and sanctuary among civilian-inhabited structures, often without the knowledge or even consent of the civilian owners. Naturally, coalition forces conducting operations in proximity to civilian-occupied structures will need to limit collateral damage, and supporting fires platforms such as close air support (CAS) and indirect fire support will be severely restricted; it is a virtual guarantee that hostile forces are aware of the limits of US forces' standing rules of engagement (SROE) and intend to exploit this consideration to its maximum effect. (C) Combat has not yet taken place in the valleys of the furthest eastern and southerly limits of the AO. Enemy disposition in these areas is currently unknown. However, it is likely that austere natural and urban terrain will be used in a fashion similar to the western approaches.(S) Expected Enemy Actions
(C)
ISR photo of COP WILSON, post-seizure by US 1-BCT forces as of 13AUG2022 @ 1400 local time.
(C) NWRC forces' course of action (COA) heretofore in the vicinity of Kirov has been fast-moving, decisive rushes by lightly-supported infantry intended to seize key sites that grant maximum terrain and logistical resources. These sites include urban hubs at junctures, strategic resources such as oil and steel production facilities, seizure and sale of indigenous-grown marijuana crops, and high vantages on mountaintops that enable enemy forces to see for kilometers in multiple directions. These actions have been aided by militias such as the "7/7 Martyrs" who have been seen enforcing blocking positions in opposition to coalition troops. Heavily-entrenched positions such as COP WILSON have been reinforced by IFV, MBT, and indirect fire support via automatic grenade launchers, mortars, and artillery.
(S) Enemy forces currently hold a positioning advantage against coalition forces and have enhanced freedom of movement outside areas directly secured by either 1-BCT or UN BLUE units. It is most likely that NWRC will seek to canalize coalition forces into enormous L-shaped far ambushes during clearance operations, where heavier weapon systems will suppress and render ineffective light infantry assaults. They may also limit avenues of approach altogether with cluster munitions and minefields. The higher valleys that dominate Kirov Outskirts are almost devoid of cover besides folds in terrain, and extreme caution should be exercised during movements through them.
(S)
Zor-Khalata, one of the largest standalone settlements southwest of Kirov, and suspected stronghold from which NWRC maintain command and control in the lower valley.
(S) The temptation to seek superior fighting positions in MOUT scenarios may present coalition forces with a double-edged problem, as unsupported NWRC troops have proven most lethal where fire support and ISR cannot be brought to bear against them. Analysis of AARs and POL intelligence among hostile groups suggests that enemy forces are fully willing to use human shields and local sympathizers to degrade and disrupt the effectiveness of coalition operations, while also leveraging every single civilian death, regardless of fact or circumstance, as a means to debilitate and undermine the civilian populaces' willingness to work with US/UN coalition forces and recruit both sympathizers and fighters.
(C) Summary
(C) Success of 1-506th and allied units in Kirov Outskirts will, similar to the NWRC, depend similarly upon seizure of major arteries in and out of the AO, excellent terrain usage, and support of the local population. Avoidance of collateral damage and civilian death will promote continued human intelligence gathering that will improve ISR and further limit unnecessary damage while restoring order to Turkmenistan.
Original Classifying Authority: 1-506th S-2 Intelligence
Classified By: 1LT Jason Mallory, SSG Neil White, SGT Andrew Price
Reason: 1.4(a), (c), (d)
Declassify On:
20470828END REPORT
