SECRET//REL TO USA
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE PENTAGON, WASHINGTON, DC
14 OCT 2018
MEMORANDUM FOR 1-506 IR, 2601 Indiana Ave, Fort Campbell, KY, United States 42223-0000
Delta Company, 5th Battalion, 101st Aviation Regiment, 2601 Indiana Ave, Fort Campbell, KY, United States 42223-0000
74th Squadron Detachment, 23rd Wing, 4343 George Street, Moody AFB, GA, United States 31699-0000
SUBJECT: (S) SKOZISTANSITUATION: (S) TALIBAN AND AL-QAEDA COOPERATING WITH FSKA
ANALYST COMMENT: (S) Intelligence gathered from SIGINT and HUMINT sources has indicated that the FSKA's covert operations unit: "Moxet Khan" (Pashto for Shield) has been communicating with separate Taliban and Al Qaeda cells on the subject of forming a "united front" against American/NATO forces. To this end analysis seems to suggest that the FSKA is reaching out to forces in-country who have had experience fighting American forces, and in the case of the Taliban, have the ability to bring additional forces to bear from outside the country. There also seems to be an additional party involved judging from the language of the intercepts but no concrete suspects so far exist.
Task Force Bravo's timely assault during 02-18 has yielded a trove of evidence of a confirmed effort at creating a united front of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Skozistan. The forces encountered during the assault were large and closed in from both entities judging from cell phones' contacts lists removed from many bodies all falling into two webs, one Taliban and one Al Qaeda. The Taliban representatives at the meeting were killed, and a laptop containing communiques between them and the Taliban's largest northern regional Shura's commander indicate a spike in interest in Skozistan. Also present were deleted emails between a Taliban and Al Qaeda dummy accounts trying to set up a series of meets. The one that TFB stumbled onto was not the first. Two more have already occurred and another was scheduled to occur after the one that was crashed. It is unknown if that meet has occurred post-operation. A map was also found with markings indicating recognized territories, also included were ISIS presences that the Taliban and AQS hierarchy knew about themselves. These were predominantly in the southern and southwestern region of the country, near the capital.
Meeting between FSKA and Al-Qaeda
Areas of Skozistan which have already had 506th Operations conducted are reporting mixed outcomes and varying civilian attitudes towards the NATO and US intervention in the area. After years of the civilian population tolerating and learning to accept the presence of terror cells in and around their town, the shift to all-out warfare is proving to make civilians feel uneasy for their personal wellbeing, as well as the damages being caused to their properties and livelihoods. The feeling of unease appears to be attributed to the relative success of the patrol(s) conducted within their respective towns. Towns such as Nefer (Ja'Arbah Province), KalaeNoowi & Ramir, (Fafreaji Province) - where the patrol was able to successfully push out and hold out insurgent forces - are showing an uptick in local commerce, and civilians are generally reported as receptive to US operations. By stark contrast, the towns of Karift and Limar (Ja'Arbah Province) have seen terror operations remain in town, if not escalate more than they were already. Civilians in these areas are showing signs of unrest, and increasing anti-US rhetoric is showing up across all SIGINT and HUMINT channels.
As expected, terror cell leaders in these areas are doing all they can to encourage and support that rhetoric. Rumors of localized crime spread like wildfire through the troubled regions of Skozistan, with every stabbing or shooting being turned into another argument for civilians to "pick up arms" and "defend the nation". In reality, most of these events are simply regular crime, but it is true that some of these attacks are Taliban and Al Qaeda, or a terror cell and the FSKA, clashing with each other - with no connection to the 506th, US or NATO operations.
The draw-down of ISIS in Syria which was originally observed in mid-July, and reported 27 JULY 2018, has been continuing throughout recent months and soon expected to reach its conclusion. Compared to the initial SIGINT numbers (500-2,000), the conclusion of their migration should show numbers well in excess of 10,000 entering Skozistan, based on current multi-sourced intelligence. These insurgents are expected to enlist in the ranks of the Taliban or Al Qaeda. This migration is expected to mostly take place across the southern Skozistan-Afghanistan border, rather than the borders with Tajikistan.
SITUATION: (S) WASIF IBN TAZI INTERROGATION
ANALYST COMMENT: (S) Interrogation summary for Wasif Ibn Tazi for immediate release to Commander, 1-506th, 101st ABN and coalition partners operating throughout Skozistan.
Wasif Ibn Tazi is a skilled perfectionist with an extensive electrician's background, a bomb maker, recruiter and educator for the Taliban. He was questioned regarding poor workmanship on explosive devices found in the AO and he adamantly blamed those mistakes on other, poorly trained, bomb makers. He showed great pride in his electronic and explosive device construction and said his students are the best in Skozistan.
The interrogation revealed that Wasif has at least 5 highly proficient IED factories in full operation, with twice as many expected to complete construction and become operational in the next 3-6 months.
For pressure plate IEDs, his construction method includes using incredibly low tolerances in the pressure plate, as well as a unique design to the pressure plate itself. Rather than traditional linear pressure plates, Wasif's men use circular plates surrounding the charge itself. This is, he proudly described, what leads to the unprecedently low disarm rate for his IEDs - engineers simply can't get close enough to do anything about them. These plates are then connected to a simple charge, typically old MBT rounds or mortar shells. With this information in mind, it's strongly recommended that IEDs are avoided and no attempt to disarm them is made.
Wasif also claimed to have access to several large stockpiles of NATO munitions, distributed through a number of caches across Skozistan. The munitions from these chaces are used in VBIEDs, IEDs and suicide vests. Simple to construct, the plastic explosive can easily be connected to a variety of triggers, ranging from simple switches to timers and wireless control.
With great pride, Wasif indicated to having several hundred followers throughout Skozistan, ranging everywhere from blackmailed civilians to people of influence within the government, police and even civilian contractors working with NATO. Wasif has been able to orchestrate a network of willing participants, all working together except NATO and the US. It's been indicated that these sleeper cells are ready to activate on a moments notice, and they are more than willing to give their lives for Allah in whatever way they are instructed.
Following the interrogation of Wasif, and combined intelligence efforts, the general locations of several previously unknown IED locations have been revealed. While it is probable these devices exist, it cannot be found without great caution as this may be a trap ensnaring US forces in an ambush. The relevant locations will be passed to Task Forces as they operate in these regions.
The intelligence community will continue to work with multiple intelligence sources to attempt to find more information about these caches, further IED locations, and to better understand the network of IED factories throughout Skozistan.
Classified By: S-2 Intelligence CommandReason: 1.4(a) and (c)Declassify On: 20281014
END REPORT
SECRET//REL TO USA
These published documents are the fictional works of the S-2 Intelligence Team of the 506th IR Realism Unit
