TOP SECRET // REL TO USA
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE PENTAGON, WASHINGTON, DC
29 OCTOBER 2020
Chernarussian Chemical Weapons Capabilities Report, Chernarus
(TS) Since arrival in Chernarus, all BLUFOR elements have sought a definitive answer as to whether the Chernarussian government and the NSLA were able to successfully produce chemical weapons on a large scale. Intelligence gleaned from the interrogation of several captured HVIs determined that the NSLA actively pursued a means of production and weaponization for chemical weapons since mid-June of 2018. Nevertheless, S-2 believes the NSLA does not have the ability to deploy chemical weapons.
(TS) Since the 506th’s deployment to Chernarus, S-2 has conducted extensive intelligence efforts to uncover and positively determine the native capability for a deployable chemical weapon. Shortly after deploying to Chernarus, it was S-2’s recommendation that the 506th IR RU not deploy the personal protective equipment that would be necessary to operate in a chemical environment, due to the lack of evidence detailing a Chernarusian chemical weapons capability. New evidence has recently come to S-2’s attention to support this position.
(TS) For example, S-2 is now aware of an industrial chemical plant located in central Chernogorsk that previously synthesized large amounts of sodium fluoride, but was retrofitted around March to produce methylphosphonyl difluoride. Methylphosphonyl difluoride is an active ingredient used in the production of sarin. Intensive interrogations of the Minister of Energy, Dr. Selarome Ove, indicate that nearly 26,400 lbs of methylphosphonyl difluoride were produced and stored in central Chernarus (see below for Site A), which could have potentially been incorporated into a deployed tactical chemical weapon capability. These warehouses were poorly controlled, and it is highly likely that portions of this stockpile were further disseminated throughout the AO. Luckily, independent analysis by NATO CBRN teams of these natively produced precursor chemicals shows that the Minister and his team were not able to achieve the intended purity thresholds for either methylphosphonyl difluoride or the deployable sarin, resulting in rapid instability and use-degradation in all produced batches.
(TS) However, the Chernarusian chemical weapons program was recently able to achieve stable sarin. Dr. Ove determined a method for reducing the degradation effect and subsequent corrosiveness of sarin. This allowed for a more stable version with a longer storage lifespan, which created the possibility of sarin-loaded warheads. This was a necessary step for the development and stockpiling a large number of chemical munitions. This process was crucial in the production efficacy of sarin, but did not occur until late September 2020.
(TS) Furthermore, “Volcanoes”, the colloquial term that Minister Selarome Ove used to describe short-range rockets capable of CW warheads, have been identified as an upscaled version of the US-based M687 binary chemical delivery artillery shell, intended for chemical warfare employment. Dr. Ove’s hand in development included both the redesign of the original shell into a warhead for both rocket and missile use across multiple platforms and sizes, as well as regulating the payload while allowing greater deployability across multiple platforms. This includes fixed wing and rotary-wing aircraft, surface-to-surface missiles, and multiple launch rocket system rockets.
(TS) Although the threat of medium and long range tactical chemical weaponry via ‘Volcanoes’ seemed to be a possibility, it was revealed to S-2 by Minister Ove in exchange for continued leniencies that the NSLA had a very limited stock of stable sarin. And all of that stock now resided in the 506th IR RU’s AO. Namely, 990 lbs of sarin were stored in Chernogorsk in a large warehouse near the train unloading area for the pier on the southern coast of the city (Site B). An additional two tons of Isopropylamine and 4x 660 gallon holding tanks of isopropyl alcohol, both of which are necessary for sarin synthesis, were found in two other warehouses located in Elektrozavodsk (see below for Site C). Due to the use-ready state of the canisters, as well as the site’s immediate proximity to a large water source, NATO CBRN teams arrived to perform hydrolysis in place, minimizing the risk of spill or contamination.
(TS) After Action Reviews submitted by coalition forces operating in the AOR have not indicated any BLUFOR personnel experiencing symptoms consistent with hazardous exposure to toxic materials, to include sarin or other organophosphorus agents, beyond that reported in normal combat and support operations. Medical examinations and follow-on questionnaires conducted with local civilians, as well as those who are associated with the NSLA and were captured or apprehended, have also largely tested negative. The only known individuals exhibiting symptoms are those who were either directly involved in the production or transport of methylphosphonyl difluoride, or had direct and repeated contact with those that were directly involved in the production or transportation.
(TS) Coalition forces operating in the northeast region of the Chernarussian AOR are advised to avoid sending direct and indirect fire on or immediately near large chemical holding tanks or industrial warehouses to help minimize risk of collateral damage, as well as to limit the exposure and possible contamination of BLUFOR and local populations.
(TS) In conclusion, with the NSLA’s known MLRS positions having been neutralized by the 74th Detachment and D Company, as well as all of the known stockpiles of chemical weapon precursors having been accounted for and destroyed, S-2 believes the threat of the NSLA utilizing chemical weapons against BLUFOR remains a remote possibility.
Classified By: S-2 Operations Command
Reason: 1.4(a)
Declassify On: 20351024END REPORT
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