SECRET//NOFORN
UNITED STATES ARMY
INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND, FORT BELVOIR, VA
01 NOV 2022
(S//FVEY) New World Revolutionary Corps (NWRC) Electronic Warfare (EW) Capabilities Assessment
(U) Administrative
*All acronyms utilized in the following brief are proactively defined and utilized strictly for the streamlining of text and characters. All acronyms in the following report are defined/transcribed in full upon initial use and then abbreviated for subsequent use. The "Spoilers" marked part below contains utilized acronyms/abbreviations and their definitions and is closed simply to condense report size.
NOFORN/NF - No Foreign Dissemination (NOFORN//NF) caveat is used to identify intelligence that an originator has determined that may not be provided in any form to foreign governments, international organizations, coalition partners, foreign nations, or immigrant aliens without foreign disclosure approval. Previously, this was seen/used by S-2/S-3 in the form of classification marking (SECRET//REL TO USA).
FVEY - The Five Eyes (FVEY) is an intelligence alliance comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These countries are parties to the multilateral UKUSA Agreement, a treaty for joint cooperation in signals intelligence. The FVEY classification caveat fills the role of what would otherwise be marked "REL TO AUS, CAN, NZ, UK, USA".
CUI - Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI): Previously "For Official Use Only/FOUO" caveat for classification of internally distributed unclassified information intended for controlled release to authorized persons only; not sensitive enough to warrant SECRET marking and handling procedures.
(S//FVEY) Overview(S//FVEY) From the onset of the United Nations Operation in Turkmenistan (UNOTURM) peacekeeping and relief initiative, authorized under UNSC Resolution 2637, US forces conducting operations across Turkmenistan have encountered a broad array of modern weapons systems and technology which has been used against not only US and UN coalition peacekeepers, but against indigenous non-combatants as well. The appearance of these systems is consistent with organizations and state actors who utilize conflict zones as a means to test and evaluate the effectiveness of each, with little regard for geopolitical consequences or collateral damage. Furthermore, many of these systems have been identified as not having been sold or otherwise provided to Turkmenistan through any documented or verifiable sale, or transfer of arms & technology, confirming that the sale and transfer of these weapons and technology exist as part of a wider "black market", the nature and extent of which remains largely unknown.
(S//FVEY) Recent reporting and continued intelligence paint a clear picture of current and continued foreign material support to the New World Revolutionary Corps (NWRC), most of which has been identified to originate from two foreign governments- the People's Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The degree and details of this support vary between each entity, but it is all but confirmed that Iran serves as the logistical bedrock of this support, moving materials across the border region of Iran and Turkmenistan via routes through the Turkmen-Khorasan Mountain Range, as well as via the Caspian Sea. Several groups have been identified as likely facilitators for the smuggling of materials once they cross the southern border, though evidence suggests not all of these groups are providing these materials to the NWRC. Some, such as the Silk Road Nomads- are moving food and other provisions from Iran into a number of communities and hamlets west of the capital. However, the Sadikahu, who have maintained control and influence along a substantial amount of the mountainous northern border, has been designated a terrorist organization and known beneficiary of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) since mid-2007, but have a history of smuggling and terrorist activities against the former Turkmen regime under Murtazayev.
(S//FVEY) Among weapons and provisions being moved to the NWRC, a Chinese-developed tactical electronic warfare system tentatively identified as the JN-2000X has been spotted in several areas of engagement during peacekeeping operations in Turkmenistan.
(S//NF) Exploitation & Capabilities Analysis: JN-2000X Tactical EW Suite/System (TEWS)(S//FVEY)
(S//FVEY) Platform Overview: The JN-2000X is the latest multi-purpose tactical electronic warfare suite to have been developed by the People's Liberation Army (PLA), as well as evidence of some technology used in current EW systems fielded by Russia. The unit itself (pictured above) offers both mobile and fixed configurations and can operate as a standalone, highly portable TEWS, or as part of a wider defensive posture when paired with properly mounted and attenuated antennas.
(S//NF) Vulnerabilities Assessment: Based on after-action reports (AARs) from a limited number of units that have encountered the JN-2000X TEWS, as well as analysis of two captured modules, the current use of the TEWS is aimed at disrupting signals across multiple radio frequency bands. In almost every case, the targeted bands range across the HF, VHF, and UHF frequency ranges. For US forces, this presents an impact on tactical-level battlefield communications and overall command and control (C2) degradation. This impact increases as the distance from the source of the signal disruption is decreased, while the effect of communications disruption is decreased as the distance from the source of the signal disruption is increased, and the distance at which radio communication is no longer possible is dependent on a number of factors. Simply put, a clear line of sight (LoS) between the signal source and the disrupted device while inside the optimal disruption range will render radio communications inoperable at around 50-60% of the maximum disruption radius, depending on the configuration of the TEWS.
(S//FVEY)
Effective Recon: Visual and signals detection combined with effective knowledge of threat capabilities and limitations in advance is key to mitigating the impact of defensive electronic countermeasures (ECM) on coalition operations. The frequency decay and tactical nature of the devices, along with their use intermittently as opposed to a constant state of signal disruption mean that preemptive detection or location of these devices is unlikely, so thorough visual recon for antennas on rooftops or in proximity to defensive positions will aid coalition troops in identifying the location of the devices.
Formation Spacing: Upon loss of radio communication ability, the speed and degree of effective coordination can be dramatically impacted if not rehearsed adequately in advance. The tightening of ranks and minimizing of distances between formations can help mitigate the impact of communications loss at a tactical level, but may also incur a high risk of mass casualty incidents (MCIs) due to the decreased spacing among infantry and vehicles if targeted with explosive ordnance.
Plan/Rehearse Contingency Communication Methods: Similar to counter-IED (C-IED) and counter-unmanned aerial systems (C-UAS) operations, the utilization of means and methods to pass orders and communications that are not able to be passed wirelessly are used to preserve C2 functions. A timeless method is the utilization of a runner to communicate orders and movements between formations. Another is a predetermined visual signal or proword to indicate degradation or loss of communications and/or other essential functions. A third may be to utilize a method or medium for communication that is not degraded or otherwise rendered ineffective under the same signals being disrupted via jamming.
Render Safe/Inoperable Procedures (RSP): It is mission critical that the TEWS is located, deactivated via interacting with and manually switching off the device, and then either destroyed or rendered inoperable in this specific order to mitigate the continued impact to US and UNOTURM forces. The JN-2000X TEWS is equipped with a type of counter-tampering device which will activate and run the module beyond the means of deactivation, except by servicing and dismantling the TEWS in its entirety. For both the safety of operations for ground forces as well as the preservation of materials for site exploitation, it is highly recommended to avoid destroying or tampering with the TEWS prior to manually turning off the system. Once the TEWS is deactivated/shut off, and tactical sabotage to prevent reacquisition by enemy combatants is mission essential, proper marking and preparation for destruction/"blowing in place" (BIP) may be initiated.
(S//FVEY) Summary & Conclusion(S//FVEY) US and UNOTURM coalition forces are urged extreme caution upon encountering disruption effects consistent with the JN-2000X or similar tactical EW platforms, and to utilize directed or unit-specific tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in order to delay, disrupt, and defeat the threat posed by TEWS.
(C) Additional(C) An NWRC-held field headquarters (FHQ) has been located in the south-central [GRIDREF 066042] area of Sultanbent, which has also served as a forward aerial refueling point (FARP) and artillery base for indirect fire (IDF) that has targeted US forces positions already. Based on the most recent reports, S-2 believes with a high degree of confidence that the deployment and use of TEWS is highly probable.
Original Classifying Authority: 1-506th S-2 Intelligence
Classified By: 1LT Jason Mallory, CW2 Juan Reynoso
Reason: 1.4(a),(b),(c),(d)
Declassify On:
2047NOV01
END REPORT
