SECRET
UNITED STATES ARMY
INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND, FORT BELVOIR, VA
24 SEP 2023
(S) Reconnaissance Report: COP Ludlow
(S)
Fig. 1: COP Ludlow
Fig. 2: Approximate Layout of COP Ludlow
(S) From reviewing helmet camera footage and pictures from Stalker 1, S-2 has developed an approximation of COP Ludlow's general layout. Due to limitations of the night vision and image capture equipment, Stalker's position relative to the COP, and the terrain, much of the North side of the COP was obscured, causing possible inaccuracies in said approximation. (S) Contact between Stalker 1 and COP Ludlow during AUX-B, OVG 07-23 was made, resulting in 1x disabled UH-1 and multiple EKIAs in and around the COP. Close air support (CAS) missions were also conducted on high priority targets in and around the COP.(S) Outer Defenses
(S) COP Ludlow is heavily fortified to the North by multiple strongpoints on elevated positions. Notably, Hill 33 contains a vehicle bunker, and Hill 31 contains a mortar bunker. The MSR leading into the COP is also secured by a checkpoint. Type 2 control CAS missions were authorised on these bunkers, though Stalker 1 was unable to confirm BDA. It is likely that even if these missions were successful, the KMN may have replaced and/or reinforced these positions since.
(S)
Figs. 3 & 4: Northern Strongpoints
(S)
Fig. 5: Base of Large Antenna and Guard Bunkers
(S) To the East of the COP is a large antenna/radar and multiple guard bunkers. S-2 believes the antenna/radar to be anti-air in nature, and thus a high-priority target. (S) Stalker 1 has also confirmed that the land bridge to the West of the COP is blocked by a minefield.(S) Inner Compound
(S)
Figs. 6 & 7: Guard Tower and Large Barracks Building
(S) Multiple guard towers surround the COP, with direct lines of sight of the surrounding buildings, which are also fortified with sandbags, camo nets and hesco barriers. The top of the large barracks building also sports a small antenna, possibly for communications.(S)
Fig. 8: Barracks, ATC and Garages
(S) The garage area is positioned to the East of the COP, along with another large antenna. The barracks and garages areas are separated by a concrete wall that's likely to be susceptible to breaching charges. Although not pictured, the HQ building is presumed to be situated next this large antenna.(S)
Fig. 9: Helipad
(S) To the West of the COP is a helipad, mainly used by UH-1 Iroquois "Huey" helicopters.(S) Additional Notes
(S) COP Ludlow is the last remaining KMN communications base, which has been responsible for coordinating KMN's indirect fire (IDF) missions and CAS missions throughout the Republic, and is heavily defended. Although the COP does not contain any innate anti-air capability, its proximity to Airbase Sarsfield has thus far shielded it from any overt BLUFOR air-to-ground actions, while HQ Bainbridge to its North provides it with IDF support, and until phase 07-23, COP Tillman has been its armored support contingent.
(S) The strength of COP Ludlow lies not in its own strength and assets, but in being the communication link between multiple key KMN strongpoints. Conducting a successful assault on COP Ludlow will require BLUFOR to first systematically destroy any supporting assets within the vicinity: HQ Bainbridge, COP Tillman, and OP Swanson. As of phase 08-23, only HQ Bainbridge remains.
Original Classifying Authority: 1-506th S-2 Intelligence
Classified By: 1LT J. N. Lee, SSG Price
Reason: 1.4(a), (c), (d)
Declassify On:
20480925END REPORT
